Smoking Gun - RTI Documents Expose Salmon Cover-Up

On 21 February 2025, a Tasmanian government official sent an email that would expose one of the most concerning cases of regulatory capture in the state’s history.

Stuart Bowman, the government’s Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Programme Manager, confirmed in writing to the salmon industry that they could use florfenicol—a powerful antibiotic unapproved for Tasmanian waters—simply by having a veterinarian compound it under prescription. No environmental assessment required. No public consultation needed. No federal oversight necessary.

“Your understanding is correct,” Bowman wrote to Salmon Tasmania, “florfenicol could be used off-label in salmon under a veterinary prescription.”

With those 14 words, government handed industry a blueprint to bypass every environmental safeguard designed to protect Tasmania’s marine environment and public health.

What happened next, revealed through two tranches of Right to Information (RTI) documents released last week, suggests a high degree of coordination – six months of secret planning between government and industry, systematic concealment of a catastrophic mortality event and the later declaration of an “emergency” that followed months of internal planning to justify what had been decided from the start.

This is not a story about policy disagreement or regulatory confusion. This is a story that appears to illustrate a deceptive strategy deployed by officials.

The Secret Confirmed – 21 February 2025

The paper trail begins with an email from Salmon Tasmania to Stuart Bowman on 18 February 2025.

The salmon industry was seeking what they delicately termed “legal alternatives” to access florfenicol. They acknowledged that seeking formal approval through the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA) “could take 1-2 years”—too long for their purposes. They wanted to know – could they use it now, without approval?

Bowman’s response was swift and unequivocal. Yes, they could. Under Tasmanian legislation, pure florfenicol powder could be supplied to veterinarians for compounding, then used off-label under veterinary prescription.

This wasn’t a loophole discovered by industry—this was government actively confirming how to circumvent federal regulatory processes.

And it happened whilst the worst mortality event in Tasmanian aquaculture history was unfolding—an event that would see over 5,500 tonnes of dead fish reach southern landfills in February alone, with true losses across all recovery pathways remaining concealed from the public for months.

The Crisis They Hid – February-March 2025

Whilst government was confirming regulatory workarounds for industry, an unprecedented catastrophe was unfolding in Tasmanian waters.

Between February and March 2025, the salmon industry experienced a mortality crisis of unprecedented scale. The Environment Protection Authority reported that in February 2025 alone, over 5,500 tonnes of dead salmon mortality waste—largely attributed to P. salmonis and exacerbated by warm water—was received by regulated waste facilities in the south of the state. This figure represents only the most diseased fish that reached landfill in one month in one region. Industry recovery priorities follow a strict hierarchy – harvest what can still be sold, render what remains into fish meal and oil, convert suitable material into ensilage for animal feed and only landfill what’s completely unusable.

The scale defies comprehension.

The 2023-24 Macquarie Harbour event, which dominated headlines and triggered political controversy at that time, saw 1.15 million kilograms die over seven months. The fact that 5.5 million kilograms reached southern landfills in a single month—the disposal method of absolute last resort—indicates catastrophic mortality that also included emergency harvesting, rendering and ensilage across the entire state over multiple months. When all mortality pathways and locations are considered, total losses likely represent a substantial portion of annual statewide production. The precise scale remains concealed behind commercial confidentiality claims, but when compared to the Macquarie Harbour event, this was likely the most severe mortality crisis in Tasmanian aquaculture history.

No emergency declarations were issued. No public health warnings were released. No acknowledgement of crisis appeared in government communications. The salmon industry continued operations, government regulators maintained public silence and the bodies piled up along with washed-up fat balls—whilst the public remained confused and almost entirely ignorant of the extent of the mortality and the secret backroom dealings about florfenicol.

Why the silence?

The RTI documents make the answer clear – public disclosure of the February-March catastrophe would have complicated the carefully orchestrated strategy to introduce florfenicol. Better to minimise the crisis whilst laying regulatory groundwork, then manufacture an “emergency” later on more favourable terms.

“Anticipating Future Use” – April 2025

By mid-April, with millions of dead fish already disposed of, government and industry moved to the next phase of coordination.

On 15 April, Chief Veterinary Officer Kevin de Witte sent an email to industry representatives that challenged the appearance of regulatory independence.

“In your dual ST/FRDC roles,” he wrote, addressing them in their industry capacities, “and anticipating future use of FFC—can you look into Australian requirements for FFC?”

Read that phrase again – “anticipating future use.”

This is not a regulator responding to industry request.

This is a government official proactively planning introduction of an unapproved chemical with industry partners.

The response, received the next day, revealed how far coordination had already progressed.

“Absolutely,” industry replied. “I have been investigating this already and flagged it with the APVMA as a likely incoming application.” The email detailed extensive knowledge of regulatory pathways, referenced Chilean pharmacokinetic data and outlined strategies for formal registration.

Then came the critical admission – “progressing a Minor Use Permit for florfenicol, OR adding salmon to the label of a Registered product, is the preferred longer-term approach.”

Translation – we can already use it off-label (thanks to the February confirmation), but we want formal registration for long-term legitimacy.

The Chief Veterinary Officer’s response? “I hope a position can be found that allows for use in fish. Please let me know if I can assist in any way.”

This is not regulation. This is partnership.

The Strategy Formalised – 30 June 2025

On 30 June 2025, the Joint Salmonid Industry Health Group convened to formalise what had been coordinated over the preceding months.

The meeting minutes, marked for government officials and industry representatives sitting together, document the captured relationship in black and white.

Under “Florfenicol status update,” the minutes record:

Confirmation that off-label use via veterinary compounding is legal in Tasmania
Identification of Abbey Animal Health as supplier pursuing formal registration
Agreement that registration is “the preferred longer-term solution” whilst “off-label use is permitted in the interim”
Chief Veterinary Officer confirmation that “NRE [Department of Natural Resources and Environment Tasmania] will support this Registration application”

Then came the line that exposes coordinated public relations strategy:

“The group agreed that clear and proactive communication around why florfenicol is the preferred treatment will be important.”

Government and industry, sitting together, agreeing on how to message the public about using a chemical not yet approved for use. This is not regulatory oversight—this is joint marketing planning.

The documented timeline of events—spanning the CVO’s proactive planning with industry in April and the subsequent regulatory endorsement—shows that the August emergency application was a coordinated public outcome following months of private preparation.

Environmental Protection as Afterthought – 29 July 2025

On 29 July 2025, with the florfenicol strategy decided and coordination complete, someone finally thought to draft an environmental monitoring protocol.

The 28-page document, obtained through RTI, is remarkable for what it admits and what it’s designed to prevent.

The stated purpose – “to understand the potential fate in the environment of florfenicol when administered in-feed.”

They don’t know what will happen environmentally—but they’re proposing to use it anyway. Environmental assessment isn’t a prerequisite for approval; it’s something to figure out afterwards.

The protocol’s design appears to favour limited detection, proposing intensive monitoring only for the first three treatments and progressively eliminating sampling points if no detections are found, despite the acknowledged goal to “understand the potential fate in the environment”:

Comprehensive monitoring only for the “first 3 treatments” then scaled back dramatically
Wild fish sampling reduced from standard 48 fish to just 8 fish per event
Sample points to be progressively eliminated if no detections found (absence of evidence treated as evidence of absence)
Annual reviews to be conducted by working group comprising EPA, Chief Veterinary Officer and Industry representatives

The regulated industry is helping to design their own monitoring—regulatory capture doesn’t get more explicit than this.

“Government Takes the Lead” – 4 August 2025

On 4 August 2025, industry made their boldest request yet.

The Salmon Industry Working Group prepared an agenda paper for their meeting that day. Under “Florfenicol,” they included a formal recommendation:

“Government takes the lead in proactively communicating the importance of florfenicol use, for the management of P. salmonis, to the broader community.”

Industry was explicitly requesting that government conduct their public relations campaign.

The agenda paper even provided pre-scripted talking points for government to use:

P. salmonis “recently emerged” in Tasmania
Vaccines administered to “all Atlantic salmon”
“No vaccine is 100% protective” (justifying chemical intervention)
Florfenicol “not an antibiotic of critical importance to human health” (downplaying resistance concerns whilst distracting from impacts on other fish and the ecosystem)
“Despite widespread florfenicol use in Chile, antibiotic resistance has not developed” (selective interpretation of Chilean data)

This wasn’t industry asking for government approval. This was industry providing government with the script to sell their product to the public.

The Emergency Permit Application – 13-14 August 2025

On 13 August, an industry consultant sent an email to Acting Chief Veterinary Officer Deborah McSweyn requesting a “letter of support” for an emergency permit application to APVMA for use of florfenicol.

The email is remarkable for its presumption. It provides the complete executive summary McSweyn should endorse, pre-written justifications with citations and the decision tree number for APVMA processing.

Industry wasn’t asking government to assess whether emergency approval was warranted. Industry was asking government to sign off on justifications industry had already written.

McSweyn complied the next day, 14 August.

Her letter to APVMA stated: “I have read and endorse the executive summary provided in *Abbey Labs application.” She thanked APVMA for their “swift consideration of this application.”

The same day, 14 August, Premier Jeremy Rockliff personally telephoned independent MP Peter George, warning of a “serious event” and a “brand new disease outbreak” in the salmon industry.

The timing does not appear to be coincidental.

Just five days later, on 19 August, Parliament would vote on a no-confidence motion that could end Rockliff’s premiership.

Labor had confirmed on 6 August they would move the motion when Parliament resumed. Peter George’s vote could be decisive.

But Peter George had made his price clear – in a letter to Rockliff, he demanded “banning expansion of salmon farming and the eventual banning of the farms themselves.”

The Premier needed George’s support to survive. George wanted salmon farming restricted or eliminated.

The crisis, whose timing benefited the government politically, offered a solution – reframe the industry as victim requiring government assistance rather than environmental threat requiring government restriction.

This was the culmination of a months-long strategy—an emergency narrative was deployed, potentially to aid the Premier’s political survival, designed to justify what had been planned since February whilst securing crucial crossbench support for a leader facing potential defeat.

The Truth Slips Out – Late August 2025

The manufactured emergency narrative began unravelling almost immediately.

On 27 August, Huon Aquaculture wrote to Acting Chief Veterinary Officer McSweyn with a letter marked “STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL” and warning that disclosure would cause them “competitive disadvantage.”

The letter flatly contradicted the emergency narrative – “Huon again reaffirms there is no set treatment date and we are continuing to proactively manage fish health.”

The company accused critics of “grossly politicising” the matter and stated the industry had been “engaging with Government since February about the importance of Florfenicol.”

Finally—the truth. They’d been coordinating since February. There was no sudden emergency.

Shortly afterwards, Agriculture Minister Gavin Pearce confirmed to Parliament that the emergency permit application was for “preventative” use and stated categorically – “there was no serious event in the salmon industry on 14 August.”

The Premier had claimed serious event and brand new outbreak on 14 August—just five days before a no-confidence vote that could end his premiership. The Minister later stated no serious event occurred. The industry admitted months of planning, not emergency response.

Independent MP Peter George—whose support Rockliff desperately needed to survive the no-confidence vote—had demanded restrictions on salmon farming as his price for backing the government. The manufactured emergency appears designed to reframe the industry as victim requiring government support rather than threat requiring government restriction.

When the no-confidence motion was voted on 19 August, it failed 10-24, with only Labor voting in favour. Rockliff survived to govern in minority. Whether the manufactured salmon emergency influenced crossbench voting remains unclear, but the timing—emergency declared five days before crucial vote—speaks for itself.

These statements cannot be reconciled—suggesting the “emergency” was primarily a public justification for an outcome decided months earlier.

What the Wild Fish Contamination Reveals

Meanwhile, as government and industry were coordinating florfenicol strategy in secret, independent testing was revealing the consequences of existing antibiotic use.

In March 2025, wild blue mackerel caught near salmon leases were found to contain oxytetracycline at 960 micrograms per kilogram—4.8 times the legal limit for human consumption.

Wild fish captured 2.4 kilometres from lease boundaries—well beyond any supposed zone of impact—contained residues at 2.8 times the legal limit.

Most alarmingly, wild fish caught inside active leases tested at 12 times the maximum residue limit.

This wasn’t historical contamination. This happened this year, with the antibiotic currently in use. And it’s not isolated—it’s a repeated pattern across multiple companies, leases and years.

Since 2003, Tasmanian salmon farms have discharged more than 32 tonnes of antibiotics into our waters. In February 2025 alone, a single lease administered 1,133 kilograms of oxytetracycline over 13 days.

The RTI documents from early August show an industry veterinarian stating that oxytetracycline had been “largely ineffective during the mortality event.” After pumping more than a tonne of antibiotic into one lease in under two weeks, it didn’t work.

So industry’s solution? Introduce a different antibiotic, repeat the same intensive dosing and expect different results.

The Chilean Catastrophe We’re Copying

The RTI documents reference Chile repeatedly—but only to cherry-pick data supporting florfenicol whilst ignoring catastrophic outcomes.

What industry tells government:

Florfenicol is “widely used” and “treatment of choice” for P. salmonis in Chile
“Despite widespread use, resistance has not developed”

What industry doesn’t emphasise:

Chile uses 360,000 kilograms of florfenicol annually—3,600 times more than Chilean human medicine
Despite this massive deployment, P. salmonis still causes 50-97% of disease mortality
Chilean marine environments are now “commonly associated with high incidence of antibiotic multi-resistant bacteria”
The Chilean industry is chemically dependent and still losing most fish to disease

The 3 July meeting notes with Skretting reveal what industry quietly acknowledges amongst themselves – “there is no prophylactic Abx [antibiotic] use in Chile and OTC [oxytetracycline] is ineffective.”

Oxytetracycline—Tasmania’s current antibiotic—is already useless in Chile.

How long before florfenicol follows the same trajectory?

The notes also record that vaccine protection against P. salmonis initially lasted 260 days but later declined to just 130 days. Vaccines are losing effectiveness under constant disease pressure—exactly as immunology predicts.

Tasmania is replicating Chile’s failed model whilst hoping we will get different results. Government officials coordinating this strategy know the Chilean outcomes—they reference the data—yet proceed anyway.

The Contaminated Dinner Table

Australian families eating Tasmanian salmon have no way of knowing:

Whether their fish came from pens where mass mortality occurred
Whether those pens were treated with antibiotics that proved ineffective
Whether withholding periods were actually observed
Whether residue testing detected contamination
Whether wild fish caught by recreational fishers contain illegal antibiotic levels

Government knows these answers—or they should. They have the data. They’ve simply decided that industry’s commercial interests in secrecy outweigh the public’s right to food safety information.

Evidence of Regulatory Capture

These RTI documents expose more than florfenicol approval—they expose complete regulatory failure.

This is about more than just one chemical or one industry. This is about whether Tasmania has functioning democratic institutions or whether those institutions have been captured by the interests they’re meant to oversee.

When a government official confirms how to bypass federal oversight, that’s capture.

When a Chief Veterinary Officer emails industry about “anticipating future use” of unapproved chemicals, that’s capture.

When government and industry sit together planning chemical introduction and public messaging, that’s capture.

When industry can request government “take the lead” in public communications and government complies, that’s capture.

When environmental monitoring is designed by the regulated to minimise detection, that’s capture.

When a Premier manufactures emergency narrative to justify pre-planned outcomes, that’s capture.

This isn’t regulatory failure—it’s regulatory abandonment. The system hasn’t broken down; the documented evidence suggests it was deliberately circumvented by officials.

The documented evidence demands answers. The timeline speaks for itself.

The people of Tasmania deserve government that protects public interest, not industry profits. We deserve regulators who enforce environmental safeguards, not officials who help circumvent them.

We deserve transparency, not coordinated secrecy.

Whether Parliament acts or not will reveal whether Tasmania’s democratic institutions serve the public—or those who have captured them.

*The Consultant’s Role – Nautilus Collaboration

The emergency permit application was coordinated not by Abbey Labs directly, but by Nautilus Collaboration, a Tasmanian-based aquaculture consultancy specialising in environmental compliance and certification. On 13 August, a Nautilus consultant emailed Acting CVO McSweyn requesting the support letter, providing pre-written justifications and the complete executive summary for government endorsement.

Nautilus Collaboration’s involvement reveals the sophisticated commercial infrastructure supporting florfenicol introduction. The consultancy serves as intermediary between Abbey Labs—a Sydney pharmaceutical manufacturer whose florfenicol product is registered only for pigs—and Tasmania’s salmon industry, demonstrating how consultants facilitate industry coordination with government whilst maintaining commercial distance from controversial decisions.

The email shows Nautilus actively orchestrating the application by drafting government’s support letter, providing citations to Chilean research favourable to florfenicol and coordinating the regulatory strategy. This is regulatory consulting as strategic facilitation—helping industry achieve predetermined outcomes by managing the paperwork that secures government endorsement.

Editor’s Note
This investigation is based on two comprehensive tranches of documents obtained through Tasmania’s Right to Information Act 2009 – RTI 013-2025-26 and RTI 007-2025-26, representing official government correspondence, meeting minutes and internal documents from multiple agencies including the Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Environment Protection Authority and industry communications.

Additional sources include publicly available EPA reports, parliamentary Hansard records, peer-reviewed scientific literature and government media releases.

This is an ongoing investigation. If you have information relevant to this matter, please contact [email protected]. Source confidentiality will be rigorously protected.

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