In his address at the Hobart Town Hall, Andrew Wilkie, labelled the Tasmanian Parliament ”a dogs breakfast” with “a self evident lack of quality”. Yet he acknowledged that Lara Giddings and David Bartlett were “good people”. In fact, most, if not all members of parliament, are basically “good people”: (HERE: Has Politics Failed Us?: No, but there’s a lack of authenticity, passion and leadership)

Why then is our state parliament such an object of derision? Why are our politicians held in such low public esteem, to the point where regardless of how many we have, there are too many? Indeed some of us would have none, or be happily managed by Victorians or perhaps anyone else. Such a state of affairs should be an indictment on all of us.

We might ask.

Why is there no real debate on any of the major issues (or any issue really)? Why is there only point scoring, name calling and schoolyard bickering?

Why is there so little forensic examination of the adequacy or appropriateness of the legislation in place (for example, the Boundary Fences Act 1908 is about having “rabbit proof (!) fences around our properties”); why is it so often left to the media, always on the lookout for scandal and sensationalism, to expose inadequacies of legislation whether it be child prostitution or teenage homelessness? One could go on.

The answer might be that we expect too much; after all we are only fallible mortals. It might be too that we are simply too cynical or sarcastic, or consumed by self interest to be fair minded, open minded or indeed rational. It is all these. Yet, it is undeniable that politicians and politics are on the nose and have been for some time.

If good people produce such a universally criticised outcome (politics) the answer might be in the environment in which they operate. The criticisms which abound- too many politicians, no leadership, instability, no accountability, self interest, etc – make it plain that the system we have is failing to meet our expectations. We should ask is it appropriate, or as in most things, is there a use-by date.

Dr Ralph Chapman, many readers might remember, was a highly respected lecturer in political science at the University of Tasmania for many years. He often gave expert advice to Government and was a member of the Board of Inquiry into the Size and Constitution of the Tasmanian Parliament (Morling Inquiry). In 1998 he was reported as saying that it was remarkable that a system devised over centuries in a heavily populated, monarchical, geographically compact England could be transplanted with little modification to a remote, thinly populated island and former convict settlement. That it has seemingly worked so well could be said to be even more amazing. But he argued, “it’s time Tasmania ended its dependence on the Westminster system”. That system, he said, “is a colonial relic in both an historical and real sense”. (Mercury 1998) Unfortunately, despite the many inquiries, the arguments remain, and if anything changes, it is that the system has become even more dysfunctional.

There are a number of seemingly insurmountable barriers. One is the self interest of almost all the players; politicians, media, interest groups. Another is the goal of a policy outcome rather than system reform and design to meet community needs and aspirations. Too many suggestions for change are really focused toward achieving unrealised policy outcomes. Another is an apparent untouchability about the “Colonial relic” as Dr Chapman called it, despite its having been substantially refashioned. Instead there is the tendency to focus on particular aspects without endeavouring to understand that there are many parts, some of which are fundamentally contradictory, compounded by a woeful a lack of knowledge about our institutions their function and their origins.

Perhaps we should start again from scratch.

If we had such an opportunity we might start by identifying the political values or beliefs about how Tasmania’s system of government should operate. If we did, we might find that they would include (in no particular order) the following:

Representativeness: Tasmania’s Hare-Clark voting system is properly seen as providing a degree of representativeness better than most other legislatures. Indeed its strong community support has ensured its retention which was reflected in the terms of reference of the Morling Board of Inquiry. In other words many want a Parliament which accurately represents the opinions and values of the electorate (ie to be a mirror of the community’s mind), because proportional representation is recognised as the most appropriate electoral system to use, with the degree of representativeness determined by the number to be elected.

Stable government: Almost everyone it seems, not just business, wants stable government. But there is no clarity on what is meant. To many it seems, it means “majority government” because having a solid parliamentary majority is seen as the way to ensure that Government is free from threats of being forced to an early election. This arises from the fact that Government is constantly subject to what is termed “having the confidence of the Parliament”. A government which loses support for its Budget or a significant “money bill” or a major issue, is expected to resign or call an election. This uncertainty is seen as the opposite to stability because the parliamentary system has evolved to virtually eliminate any distinction between money or budget bills and almost any other government proposal. This is a crucial point to recognise and is the crux to understanding why the system is failing.

Fixed terms for parliament: Notwithstanding that stipulating fixed terms for governments is contrary to the underlying principle of Westminster style parliamentary government where governments are meant to be subject to the daily “confidence” of the parliament and, by extension, the electorate, Governments are now expected to serve for set terms. Indeed notwithstanding the unpopularity of particular governments, early elections are avoided by almost everyone, except Oppositions well ahead on the opinion polls.

Accountability: Keeping governments and members of parliament accountable for their actions and behaviour is still what parliaments are meant to do, at least by the voters. It is not just issues of corruption and conflicts of interest, but also appropriateness of legislative responses, or indeed failure to respond that is a presumed and valued role of parliament.

Check on government: In Tasmania, as elsewhere in Australia, a “check” on government is seen as desirable. It is a significant, though reducing, component of public perception about the Senate, often expressed in terms of a “watchdog”, and is the essential contribution seen to be provided (and claimed by) the Legislative Council. In its simplest terms, it is generally meant that Executive government should not be able to always expect to get its own way, to do as it pleases. But there is a fine line between providing a check and obstructing.

Ministerial competence: Ministers are now expected to be competent in a managerial sense, or at least to be able to argue for and defend the management of decisions. For many this seems to imply a technical competence with the content of a portfolio area. Once, the main attribute of Ministerial competence was the application of common sense and electorate values to issues of policy implementation; of ensuring we kept to the basics. This requirement not only ignores the fact that the breadth of policy has increased enormously but that the proximity to community has almost certainly intensified.

Consensus or co-operative politics: Many in the community are sick and tired of “adversarial” politics, of needless and endless point-scoring, of election threats, childish name calling and the like and long for a parliament which debates, discusses, and examines issues and legislative proposals. This, like stable government, or fixed terms of parliament, is usually not understood or considered; but the Westminster system is inherently “adversarial”, particularly with an increasingly rigid party system (of all pursuasions).

It should be noted that these “values”are not held by everyone. But each is held by a sizable proportion of the community and each should be considered in designing a system of government that can win popular respect and support. But it is fundamental to understand that they involve much that is contradictory, and irreconcilable.

Thus we can’t have stable government and fixed terms if we also want day-to-day accountability of the Westminster tradition. We can’t have parliamentary power over legislation, potentially involving defeat of government proposals, where that almost automatically creates crises of “confidence”or questions about new elections, if we also want “stable government”. (It is worth noting that in the current Federal context, even the suggestion of a government defeat on its asylum legislation has brought questions about such an outcome bringing about an early election.)

We can’t have a parliament that is anywhere near representative if there are simply too few people elected. It cannot be a reflection of the mind of the community if significant parts are missing. Nor can we expect to produce Ministerial talent when the selection pool, the parliament, is itself too small. If we want a small pool, Ministers must be appointed from those competent, if we also want talent and managerial capacity, not to mention life experience. That means from outside the parliament.

So where do we go from here?

The House of Assembly is too small, if we expect it to provide competent Ministerial talent, a competent alternative government, and an effective mechanism which holds government to account. As this must largely come from the Government’s back bench, it is simple logic that government backbenchers should outnumber Government Ministers. But while an increase to 35 is an improvement, it is unlikely to have any dramatic effect: 3 or 4 extra bodies each side! In fact 35 as currently constituted will almost certainly guarantee more of the same.

But for many we already have too many. For some, far too many; an extra 10 is seen as an indulgence, especially when cutbacks elsewhere are the order of the day. To dismiss this concern smacks of elitism. Comparatively, for 500 000 taxpayers we do have enough; the challenge is to configure them better.

So Wilkie is on the right track when he points us to considering an amalgamation of the two Houses. In a State of 500,000 the duplication and inefficient use of resources is almost criminal, apart from the one important structural contribution it makes. This is to deny the Government with an automatic majority to do with as it pleases. For those for whom accountability and checks and balances are important, and this is most of us at some point, this feature must be retained. It is what the Legislative Councilors will describe as a “House of Review” or providing a second opinion or an independent perspective. It means unlocking government from party control.

Leaving aside the question as to how real this “second opinion” attributed to the Legislative Council is (they did pass the pulp mill bill, and the bill establishing the new, and unpopular, water authorities, the reorganisation of education, and, and…) any objective mind will regard having a break on government as a good thing (most Liberals these days seem to lament John Howard’s Senate majority as giving him too much power). Certainly its absence in Queensland is often noted.

Given such realities, there is a choice of two broad options. We could amalgamate both Houses. If we retained the current structural rules of each giving us a form of New Zealand’s MMP as Wilkie suggests, a degree of checks and balances, and a form of accountability, could be maintained. This means 15 single member seats, 6 year terms and periodic elections (with rules that don’t advantage political parties), alongside the current arrangements for the House of Assembly, giving a single House of party members and individuals where the Government does not have an automatic majority. There would be enough members to provide a useful and potentially effective committee system, and enough non government and opposition members to produce a less adversarial mode of conduct. Such a configuration was recommended by the Morling inquiry, and proposed by the TCCI at one time, but fell on tin ears.

It could be an improvement, at least as a transitional arrangement. But it does not solve the essential dilemma: creating a government which is secure but which does not have a monopoly on policy; of providing Government which is not at the daily mercy of parliament for its existence. In other words the dilemma of how to provide for stable government, fixed terms, the prospect of representativeness, accountability, supremacy of parliament over policy in which compromise and co-operation will have a better chance to flourish.

Fixed terms and stable government are structural elements in systems in which the Executive (government) is separate from the Legislature. Our Councils resemble such a model. This could very easily be achieved by simply electing the Premier on a statewide vote with a separate election for the parliament. After the last election when no one party had a majority of seats there were calls, considered calls, to determine government on the basis of the total votes cast for the parties. In other words to choose the Premier and Executive government by the vote of the people. Why not?

But let’s do so under rules determined prior to the election – the next election. Then we can have fixed terms, stable government and accountability and a proper role for parliament.

It might be worth imagining for a fleeting moment who might be candidates currently for such a vote, and who might succeed. It is also worth considering what such a statewide vote might do towards achieving greater unity throughout the State, not to mention leadership and vision.

In such a system Ministers could be appointed from outside the parliament, subject to parliamentary approval, leaving the members of parliament free to respond to the needs and views of their electorates and provide oversight and review of government performance, and consideration of policy responses, ie as a House of Review. Of course a change to the constitution would be necessary, but the thought of a cabinet comprising people who had some expertise in the area for which they were appointed is surely tempting.

But it won’t happen, unfortunately. Compromise it seems is too scarce a commodity. There is simply too much self-interest; by the media, by the current beneficiaries of the system, by many of the interest groups, and unfortunately by most of us voters, especially those of us who merely want to score points and cynically criticize. The current system will have to implode completely before we become willing to critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of the system we have allowed to develop.

However it would be nice to be wrong on this point.

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All about Brian Austen:

DOB. 8-5-1947, Launceston. Educated West Launceston Primary School, Queechy High School. Joined PMG in 1965 as a trainee telephone technician. It became Telecom. stationed at Campbell Town for 18 months. Then installing trunkline equipment throughout the north of Tasmania – from St Helens, St Mary’s and Scottsdale to Deloraine and Smithton. Joined Papua New Guinea Posts and Telegraphs in 1971-72 in Port Moresby. Undertook matriculation studies in 1972 -73 by correspondence and enrolled as an Adult Matriculant with Tas Uni in 1973. BA 1975 Hons (First Class) 1976 MA 1978 in Political Science.

Lecturers with most influence were Dr Peter Boyce, Dr Ralph Chapman, Dr Campbell Sharman. Joined Australian Bureau of Statistics in 1979 and moved to its publishing section. Produced a number of editions of the Tasmanian Year Book. Became involved in politics when Don Chipp and others created the Australian Democrats. Worked on, then managed a number of election campaigns, including the election of Dr Norm Sanders to the House of Assembly, then the Senate, and Robert Bell to the Senate in 1990. Wrote and presented submissions to Committees of Inquiry into Parliament, including the Board of Inquiry into the Size and Composition of the Tasmanian Parliament (Morling Inquiry). In my mind the terms of reference of this Inquiry inescapably led to one conclusion that the only sensible way to reduce the number of politicians was by separating the Executive from the Legislature. Such a conclusion was, at the time, a little too radical, although Dr Chapman and others since reached essentially the same conclusion.

For this conclusion I acknowledge the influence, though not the support, of Dr George Howatt. It was Dr Howatt who has been largely responsible for the retention of the Hare Clark system in the face of strong periodic threats from those who clamoured for “stability” and majority government. I saw, but Dr Howatt did not, that the essential genius of Hare Clark is producing a parliament that is representative. Such a Parliament could choose a Head of Government but it is not compatible with choosing a Head of Government of the Westminster tradition; it is this point which is not appreciated.