End To Robodebt Damage Now In Tasmanian Liberal Senate Team’s Hands

TasCOSS welcomes the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s call to halt the further expansion of the Centrelink robodebt rollout. (Recommendation 8)

“The ball’s now in the court of the Tasmanian Liberal Senate team to ensure the Turnbull Government finally shows leadership on this issue by halting the rollout and adopting all eight of the Ombudsman’s recommendations,” Kym Goodes, CEO, TasCOSS said.

“100,000 Tasmanians on age and disability pensions are next in the firing line and need protection from the extreme levels of stress, anxiety and confusion experienced by their fellow Tasmanians since the start of the robodebt system in mid-December.

“The Ombudsman has validated and supported the experiences of thousands of Tasmanians and recommends that a comprehensive evaluation occur before any further rollout

“We saw leadership on this issue from the Tasmanian Liberal team in January and we have no doubt this contributed to some of the minor changes then made in acknowledgment of the system’s multiple flaws.

“With the independent evidence presented in the Ombudsman’s report, it’s now time for our elected representatives to protect Tasmanians with decisive action.

“Unless the Government can acknowledge they got it wrong and respond appropriately to the Ombudsman’s recommendation to halt this debacle any remaining trust in the system will be lost.

“We call on the Tasmanian Liberal senate team to take this message to Canberra immediately.”

A brief summary of the report findings follows …

Read the Ombudsman’s Report at the link here:

http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/43528/Report-Centrelinks-automated-debt-raising-and-recovery-system-April-2017.pdf

Key findings from the Ombudsman’s Report

The Ombudsman’s report confirms what TasCOSS, our friends, family members, neighbours and fellow Tasmanians have experienced: the Centrelink robodebt system must be halted immediately.
It has hurt vulnerable Australians and created a situation in which:
(3.45) ‘In some instances customers may become vulnerable because of the debt raising and recovery process itself.’
Overview
The Ombudsman calls for a halt to any further rollout until a comprehensive evaluation of what has happened is undertaken. (Recommendation 8)
The Ombudsman has also called for further roll out to be done incrementally.
Critically, the Ombudsman:
• States the process itself may have caused vulnerability because of the stress it put people under.
• Calls for a review of those cases where a recovery fee has been applied when a person had not made any contact after the issuing of a letter.
• States the principle of transparent and open decision making should apply—even in automated processes—and that this did not occur. It notes that prior to changes in January, the initial letters during 2016 and some parts of January 2017 did not supply appropriate or transparent information.
• States six years is an inappropriate period of time for people to have to maintain their payslips. It notes the ATO requires two years’ worth, and this could be considered a benchmark.
About the rollout
The Ombudsman’s report notes the following regarding the robodebt rollout:
• There are major issues with the system and the rollout that are not in line with administrative law values of lawfulness, fairness, rationality, openness, transparency and efficiency.
• There was a massive project planning failure – particularly in consultation with external stakeholders – before and during the rollout.
• No stakeholder engagement, briefings or communication
• No resources to support key stakeholders who would be impacted by a broad scale rollout of a new system
• There was no planning, no testing, and no risk mitigation strategies
• Letters requesting information from individuals provided an inadequate time to respond.
About the system
The Ombudsman notes the following:
• Transparency of the system and the usability of the system was and still is, seriously flawed.
• The system does not clearly communicate and therefore has led to confusion and misunderstanding – for staff and clients.
• No modelling has been done on how many debts were likely to be over-calculated by the online system – they don’t know.
• The accuracy of the automated information needs to be validated by a human
• The capacity for the system (DHS) to respond was inadequate and the communication and actions by DHS staff was not appropriate as they had not been adequately trained in how to check/validate/respond.
• The cost impact of providing income evidence is unreasonable and needs to be reconsidered.
About the impact of the system on people
The Ombudsman notes the following:
• The risk of over-recovering debts from vulnerable people and the potential impact should have been considered
• The system has been so confusing for people to use they have in many circumstances, not engaged with the system, or given up on it and this has had an impact.
• The DHS underestimated the complexity of requirements it was shifting on to people in order to comply – and did not offer adequate assistance to people.
• That an expansion of the criteria for vulnerability should occur and the type of support offered to clients who are vulnerable should be enhanced.